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Errors and Action Monitoring: Errare
Humanum Est Sed Corrigere
Possibile
Franck Vidal*, Boris Burle and Thierry Hasbroucq
Aix-Marseille Université, CNRS, LNC UMR 7291, Marseille, France
It was recognized long ago by Seneca through his famous “errare humanum est.” that
the human information processing system is intrinsically fallible. What is newer is the fact
that, at least in sensorimotor information processing realized under time pressure, errors
are largely dealt with by several (psycho)physiological-specific mechanisms: prevention,
detection, inhibition, correction, and, if these mechanisms finally fail, strategic behavioral
adjustments following errors. In this article, we review several datasets from laboratory
experiments, showing that the human information processing system is well equipped
not only to detect and correct errors when they occur but also to detect, inhibit, and
correct them even before they fully develop. We argue that these (psycho)physiological
mechanisms are important to consider when the brain works in everyday settings in
order to render work systems more resilient to human errors and, thus, safer.
Keywords: action monitoring, errors of action, error correction, post-error slowing, partial errors, error negativity
INTRODUCTION
On Saturday, August 3rd, 1985, two trains frontally collided on the same unique railway line portion
between the Flaujac and Assier train stations in France. Thirty-five people died in this catastrophe,
henceforth termed the ‘‘Flaujac accident,’’ and many others were severely injured. Two days later,
on August 5th, the French newspaper ‘‘Le Parisien Libéré (1985)’’ headlined: ‘‘The awful error of
one single man1.’’
How could this major accident be possible? First, there were some structural reasons: only one
railway line was available for both directions of circulation and, as a consequence, only one train at a
time was supposed to use this unique line. Both trains had to pass each other at Assier train station,
where two railway lines were available. Second, there were some circumstantial reasons: one train
was late while the other one was waiting for departure in the other direction at Assier. The traffic
controller gave the go signal to the train driver at the scheduled time of departure even though the
other train (being late) had not reached the station yet. Third, although the traffic controller realized
his error almost immediately, it was useless as there was no means of communication between the
controller and the train driver.
Considering that a human error did occur, one can point to human error to explain the
catastrophe, as did ‘‘Le Parisien.’’ However, explaining this tragedy by ‘‘the awful error of one
single man’’ only, is quite short-sighted. Reason (2000) presented two classes of approaches
1L’épouvantable erreur d’un seul homme.
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in error management. The traditional one is the ‘‘person
approach,’’ which focuses on the erroneous actions and considers
them as abnormal or blameworthy behavior that should
be prevented by writing new procedures, further developing
disciplinary measures, threatening, shaming, re-training, and
so on. A more recent so-called ‘‘system approach’’ consists of
recognizing that ‘‘. . . humans are fallible, and errors are to be
expected. . . having their origins not so much in the perversity of
human nature as in ‘upstream’ systemic factors.’’ (Reason, 2000,
p. 708). If we consider the case of the Flaujac accident, although
the traffic controller did realize his error almost immediately,
once he had carried out the wrong action, the following
events necessarily developed out of his control. Suppose that
(as it has been the case later) he could have contacted
the train driver by radio, this major accident would have
been avoided.
This tragedy shows that the error was detected, as is the
case for a large majority of human errors realized, such as
those of human operators involved in integrated complex
tasks (Amalberti, 2013); if radio communication had been
allowed, it would have been corrected, thus avoiding this
catastrophe. We show in this review that the same holds
true for more elementary behaviors, such as those involved
in sensorimotor information processing realized under times
pressure: (1) the human information processing system is
equipped with an action monitoring or supervisory system,
which allows very fast detection and correction of inappropriate
behaviors. Allowing these fast corrections might improve the
safety of man–machine systems; (2) this action-monitoring
system also acts to prevent errors (when possible), to detect
abnormalities, correct errors at their very beginning (before
they manifest or just after they are committed), and, finally, to
modify response strategies for the future when, sometimes, this
action monitoring has failed in its prevention and correction
functions; certain conditions hamper the proper functioning
of the action monitoring system. Identifying them can help
avoiding deleterious situations and, therefore, contribute to
reduce the number of human errors; (3) it should be clear
that errors are integrated in the normal architecture of human
information processing, which may contribute to lending
support to the premises of the system approach; and (4) some
physiological indices of action monitoring can be used for
improving man-machine interactions.
More than 50 years ago, Rabbitt P. M. (1966), in his
pioneering work on errors in sensorimotor information
processing realized under time pressure, stated that ‘‘The speed
with which errors are recognized and corrected is an important
consideration in most industrial tasks.’’ (p. 264). We do not
pretend here to survey the whole scientific literature for all forms
of possible errors. We will mainly focus on errors occurring
in sensorimotor information processing realized under time
pressure, where a neuroscientific approach allowed for the
revealing of hidden mechanisms that were quite difficult (or
almost impossible) to evidence on the basis of behavioral
analysis alone.
Even in this case, a taxonomy of errors is necessary. One
can broadly distinguish between two types errors: perceptual
failures and motor errors (e.g., Navarro-Cebrian et al., 2013).
Perceptual failures can have two different origins: first, they
can have their origin in the nature of the stimuli (poor quality,
noised, hard to discriminate one from another, etc.) and,
therefore, these failures cannot be considered as failures of the
information processing system; second they can also be rooted in
inappropriate perceptual operations (e.g., erroneous perceptual
decision). On the contrary, errors of action purely reveal a
failure of information processing operations (e.g., erroneous
response selection processes, erroneous response execution, etc.).
We will therefore concentrate on errors of action. A primary
question of importance is concerned with how we react to errors,
measured as post-error behavior. One of the first articles of
Rabbitt and his colleagues’ pioneering work on this topic was
entitled ‘‘What does a man do after he makes an error?’’ (Rabbitt
and Rodgers, 1977, p. 727). We begin this review by examining
this point.
WHAT DOES A MAN/WOMAN DO AFTER
HE/SHE MAKES AN ERROR?
When subjects have to make fast decisions under time pressure,
they occasionally commit errors. In sensorimotor activities, the
prototypical situation for studying fast decisions under time
pressure corresponds to the reaction time (RT) paradigm, and
much has been learnt about action monitoring from RT tasks
in human (and non-human) subjects (see Figure 1 for an
illustration of a RT task). By studying ‘‘what does a man do
after he makes an error,’’ in RT tasks, it has been recognized
from the very beginning that an action monitoring system is
at work, in parallel with information processing operations.
First, it was observed that, when required, subjects performing
a choice RT task could correct most of their errors once they
had been committed, even in absence of any external error
signal (Rabbitt P. M. A., 1966; Rabbitt, 2002); moreover, mean
correction time (i.e., the delay separating the error from the
correcting response) was much shorter than mean correct RTs
(and even shorter than RTs of the types of trials leading to the
shortest RTs, i.e., repetition of the stimulus and repetition of
the response)2. This demonstrated that the subjects’ ‘‘. . .internal
monitoring of their own responses allowed them to correct
errors more quickly than they responded to any external signal
from the display’’ (Rabbitt P. M. A., 1966, p. 438). It must
therefore be admitted that subjects can rely upon a fast internal
signaling of their errors. In other words, humans can very quickly
correct their errors on the basis of internal signals. If errors
are quickly corrected, one has to admit that they are detected
earlier (before error correction), that is even more quickly.
These observations have been reproduced several times after
(e.g. Fiehler et al., 2005). Therefore, it must be concluded from
these observations that humans are endowed with an action
monitoring system that allows them correcting their errors after
2In the following all the reported results are statistically significant; for example,
shorter, longer, larger, and smaller mean ‘‘significantly longer, shorter, larger,
smaller, etc.’’
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FIGURE 1 | In the upper part of the figure an example is schematized of a
between-hand choice reaction time (RT) task. In the present example,
according to the color of the response signal, subjects must press a button
as soon as possible after its presentation, using the right thumb if the signal is
blue and the left thumb if the signal is yellow. In the lower part of the figure an
example is schematized of a Go/NoGo task. Only one response is possible
(here a button press with the right thumb). Nevertheless, a decision has to be
taken. In the present example, according to the color of the signal, subjects
have to press the button as soon as possible after its presentation if it is
yellow, but they do not respond if it is blue.
they have been detected at the very moment when these errors
were committed.
The effects of the action monitoring system are not confined
to the ongoing trial but also concern upcoming trials: RTs of trials
following an error are longer than RTs following correct trials
(Rabbitt P. M., 1966; Rabbitt, 1969; Laming, 1979; Smith and
Brewer, 1995; Allain et al., 2009). This effect, called post-error
slowing (PES), may go beyond the trial immediately following
(N+1) and may persist (although smaller) during N+2 trials (e.g.,
Rabbitt, 1969; Burns, 1971; Laming, 1979; Forster and Cho, 2014)
or beyond (Forster and Cho, 2014).
A straightforward explanation of PES would be that subjects
process information more carefully before giving their response
on the trial(s) following an error, which would lengthen RTs
(e.g., Laming, 1979; Dutilh et al., 2012). This seems quite
reasonable if one also considers that, in these errors of action,
RTs of errors are generally shorter than RTs of correct trials,
suggesting that errors occurred when information processing has
been superficial or incomplete because not long enough. This
interpretation was supported by the fact that PES has been found
to correlate with post-error accuracy (Hajcak et al., 2003; Forster
and Cho, 2014; but see Danielmeier and Ullsperger, 2011; Pereiro
et al., 2018).
However, as noted by Burns (1971) and, more recently,
emphasized by Notebaert et al. (2009), the functional
interpretation of PES as a simple reflection of more careful
behavior after an error is not that straightforward.
First, the magnitude of PES depends on the duration
of the interval separating the erroneous response from the
stimulus of the following (N+1) trial (Rabbitt, 1969; Burns,
1971; Jentzsch and Dudschig, 2009). Second, post-error accuracy
may not necessarily increase after an error (and it sometimes
decreases), even when PES is present (e.g., Rabbitt and
Rodgers, 1977; Fiehler et al., 2005; Hajcak and Simons,
2008; Carp and Compton, 2009; Notebaert et al., 2009;
Valadez and Simons, 2018; Parmentier et al., 2019). This
latter point is of importance given that, if PES is to be
interpreted as an effect of more cautious behavior, one should
expect that, subjects being more cautious, the likelihood of
committing another error is reduced. However, as stated above,
post-error improvement in accuracy (PEIA) is not always
present and, in some instances, as indicated above, accuracy is
even reduced.
Burns (1971), proposed that an orienting response (Sokolov,
1963a) to error commission is associated to response inhibition
(as proposed by Sokolov, 1963b for any orienting response),
which would slow down any subsequent action. This
interpretation was put forward more recently by Notebaert
et al. (2009), who provided convincing evidence for such an
interpretation of PES. However, given that the orienting response
is supposed to vanish quite quickly over time, this explanation
cannot account for PES at the N+2 trial (and sometimes
beyond) when evidenced (Burns, 1971; Forster and Cho, 2014).
Moreover, several authors did report PEIA associated with PES
(e.g., Laming, 1979; Marco-Pallarés et al., 2008; Danielmeier and
Ullsperger, 2011; Seifert et al., 2011; Grützmann et al., 2014;
Ruitenberg et al., 2014; Ceccarini and Castiello, 2018; Fischer
et al., 2018; Pereiro et al., 2018; Overbye et al., 2019). This
suggests that the orienting account of PES is only a part of this
complex effect.
Given that: (1) PES decreases with the duration of the delay
separating the error commission from the presentation of the
stimulus of the next trial; and (2) that it may persist during
an N+2 trial, Burns hypothesized that PES may have a double
origin: a transient inhibitory orienting response followed by a
response criterion adjustment towards a more cautious behavior.
First, the orienting response might lead to error detection and,
later, error detection would induce a more cautious behavior
(see Wessel, 2018, for a detailed elaboration of this idea).
In addition to this, several reports of PEIA associated with
PES, Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009) provided further empirical
evidence in favor of this idea. They reproduced (within and
between subjects) the influence, on PES, of the duration of the
delay separating the erroneous response from the stimulus of
the following trial, PES being shorter (but still present) at long
delays. Moreover, post-error accuracy was decreased at short
delays, but it tended to increase at long delays. Even more
importantly, the authors manipulated the perceptual difficulty of
the task (low or high contrast). In accordance with the orienting
account, contrast had no effect on post-error RTs (while it
clearly appeared on correct ones). However, this absence of
effect only held at short delays: at long delays, contrast affected
post-error RTs, and the size of this effect was not different
from that of correct trials. These latter observations were in
contradiction with the orienting account of PES but fit with
the response criterion account. In the same vein, although PES
was not associated with PEIA, Valadez and Simons (2018)
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showed that longer post-error RTs were associated with more
accurate responses.
Therefore, it seems that after an error, a transient orienting
response exerts detrimental effects on subsequent information
processing (if the delay separating the error from the next
information to be processed is too short), which tends to increase
the RT and error rate. Physiological evidence supports this view
as the early response of the visual cortex is reduced after errors
at short delays (Beatty et al., 2018). Later on, the early effects
would vanish (e.g., the reduction of the cortical visual response
disappears at long delays: Beatty et al., 2018) and a criterion
adjustment towards more cautious behavior is set, which tends to
increase RT while decreasing error rate. Depending on the delay
separating the error from the next information to be processed,
either the first or the second effect dominates (Burns, 1971;
Danielmeier and Ullsperger, 2011; Wessel, 2018).
In certain choice RT tasks, often called ‘‘conflict tasks,’’ it is
often assumed that different parts or different features of a same
stimulus may, each, activate a specific response: one activation
being be required by instructions, while another activation
would be automatically triggered. When the different features
of the stimulus concurrently activate two mutually exclusive
responses, they compete and, in order to provide the correct
response, this conflict must be solved. These situations are
called ‘‘incongruent.’’ In other situations, called ‘‘congruent,’’ the
different features of the stimulus concurrently activate the same
response, and there is no conflict. Incongruent trials generate
longer RTs and, in general, higher error rates than congruent
trials. The difference between incongruent and congruent trials
is called congruency or interference effect (see Figure 2 for
an illustration).
After an error, provided that the delay between the response
and the upcoming stimulus is long enough, the interference
effect is reduced (Ridderinkhof, 2002; Ridderinkhof et al., 2002;
de Bruijn et al., 2004; King et al., 2010; Fischer et al., 2018).
Moreover, this effect is sensitive to the general structure of the
tasks, being especially pronounced if congruent trials are more
frequent than incongruent ones and absent if incongruent trials
outnumber congruent ones (Ridderinkhof, 2002). This indicates
that the action monitoring system is extremely versatile and can
adapt to the broad context of the task.
To sum up, after making an error several things occur:
(1) Very fast corrections, if allowed, may occur, suggesting that
subjects can rely upon an action monitoring system which
very quickly generates internal error signals on the basis of
internal information.
(2) RTs are slower and slowing is explained by (at least) two
phenomena: (a) an early transient orienting response that
hampers the information processing of the next response
signal and increases RTs as well as error likelihood; and
(b) the orienting response is followed (if the delay separating
the error from the next response signal is long enough) by
cognitive control-triggered strategic adjustments set to avoid
committing new errors, which increase RTs but decrease
error likelihood.
(3) In conflict tasks, the interference effects are reduced.
It is worth mentioning that, although the discovery of post-error
behaviors dates back from the 60s, current research is still very
active in this domain and largely aimed, now, at identifying
the brain structures that are targeted by post-error action
monitoring processes (e.g., Danielmeier et al., 2015; Beatty et al.,
2018; Ceccarini et al., 2019) and also at identifying the brain
mechanisms (e.g., Purcell and Kiani, 2016; Schiffler et al., 2016;
Perri et al., 2017), brain structures (e.g., Schiffler et al., 2016;
Zhang et al., 2017; Fu et al., 2019), or neurochemical systems
(e.g., Danielmeier et al., 2015; Sellaro et al., 2015) that are
involved in or responsible for post-error behaviors.
WHAT DOES A HUMAN DO WHEN HE
MAKES AN ERROR?
As mentioned above, when subjects are required to correct their
errors as soon as possible after their commission, this correction
is very fast, and most errors are corrected (e.g., Rabbitt P. M. A.,
1966). For example, in Experiment 2 of Marco-Pallarés et al.
(2008), mean correction time was 179 ms ± 41 ms (to be
compared to 382 ms ± 22 ms for correct responses and
314 ms± 22 ms for errors); given that, for very simple responses
(e.g., a thumb key press), the time separating EMG onset from
the mechanical response in a between-hand two-choice RT task
was at least 70 ms on average (e.g., Vidal et al., 2011), this
means that the delay separating the error commission from the
(EMG) onset of its correction was about 110 ms on average,
with some corrections occurring even faster. This suggests that
the action monitoring system was sensitive to errors extremely
early—at the very moment when the error was committed or
even before: ‘‘In some sense the subject knows that his erroneous
response is wrong even before it is registered.’’ (Laming, 1979;
p. 204). If this is the case, some physiological activities should
distinguish between errors and correct responses at the very
moment when the error is committed or even before the response
is registered.
To examine the time course of physiological activities
occurring when making an error (i.e., just before, during,
or shortly after), it is mandatory to resort to high temporal
resolution methods. Among those, electroencephalography
(EEG) has provided much valuable information regarding action
monitoring processes occurring just before and shortly after
errors are committed.
Falkenstein et al. (1991) examined response-locked event-
related potentials (ERPs) on correct and erroneous responses.
They discovered that a very large ERP, was evoked on errors,
and this did not show up on correct responses. Since this ERP
seemed to be specific to errors, it was named Error Negativity
(Ne) or, later on, Error-Related Negativity (Gehring et al.,
1993; see Figure 3 for an illustration). The Ne began before
the mechanical response and culminated shortly after. This
observation indicated that, even before the error was overtly
committed, an action monitoring system detected the error or,
at least, that something was going wrong.
When examining the Ne time locked to EMG onset instead
of (mechanical) response onset, it appears that it began about
35 ms after EMG (e.g., Vidal et al., 2000) but clearly before the
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mechanical response. Therefore, the Ne is elicited during the
execution of the error and begins before its overt commission.
This is in line with the comment of Laming (1979) cited above;
however, if Falkenstein et al.’s (1991) discovery demonstrated
that something in the subject’s brain ‘‘. . . knows that his
erroneous response is wrong even before it is registered.’’
(Laming, 1979), it is not warranted that the subject himself
knows it at this very moment since the Ne can be elicited
without error awareness. Moreover, the Ne is insensitive to
such an awareness (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass et al.,
2007; although it may not be the case for perceptual errors, e.g.,
Shalgi and Deouell, 2012).
On the basis of error correction behavior, Rabbitt P. M. A.
(1966) demonstrated that the action monitoring system does
not need to rely on external feedback to quickly correct errors.
Now, one can wonder whether this system needs to rely on
internal peripheral (sensory) feedback to detect malfunctions. A
total of 35 ms (Ne onset) is, in principle, long enough to allow
reafferent information to reach the somatosensory cortex (medial
nerve electrical stimulation elicits a somatosensory response
as early as 20 ms later). Allain et al. (2004b) showed that,
in a totally deafferented patient (Cooke et al., 1985; Forget
and Lamarre, 1987) who suffered a polyneuropathy affecting
selectively the large myelinated sensory fibers, a large Ne was
evoked on errors. Her action monitoring system could not rely
on somatosensory feedback, and the early latency of the Ne
could not be accounted for by auditory (e.g., button click) or
visual (e.g., finger movement) evoked potentials. It can therefore
be concluded, in line with the general opinion in the current
literature, that the action monitoring system does not absolutely
need peripheral (somatosensory, auditory, or visual) information
to elicit the Ne and can rely on an internal simulation of the
expected effects of the motor command on the basis of just
central information.
Now, it has been shown that, provided that appropriate source
separation methods are used (e.g., Laplacian transformation:
Vidal et al., 2000; Independent Component Analysis: Roger
et al., 2010), a smaller component systematically shows up
on correct responses. This component on correct responses
remained unnoticed at the beginning since it was hidden
by large remote non-response-related components, present
due to the volume conduction effects. Separation methods
allowed for disentangling overlapping effects and unmasked
the presence of a smaller negative wave on correct trials.
Its time course and topography were similar to those of
the Ne once these separation methods were applied, which
suggests that this component and the Ne are of same
nature. Moreover, both were influenced in the same way
by explicit monitoring conditions: if subjects were explicitly
asked to rate the accuracy of their responses, both the
Ne and the post-response component elicited on correct
trials were enhanced, as compared to a non-rating condition
(Grützmann et al., 2014). Finally, the fact that intracerebral
recordings in humans pointed to the same generator, in
the supplementary motor area proper, for both components
(Bonini et al., 2014) also supports the view that they
are of the same nature. In other words, a large Ne is
elicited on errors, whereas a smaller one is elicited on
correct responses.
This indicates that the action monitoring system is always
at work (even on correct trials), but its reaction is usually
stronger on errors. These effects suggest that each response type,
whether correct or erroneous, is evaluated on-line. Although
the functional significance of the Ne is far from settled—and
this question is out of the scope of the present article—this
means that the brain is equipped with a system which function
is to take into account response correctness at the very moment
when it could occur (at least in sensorimotor activities when
carried out under time pressure). Therefore, it is clear from what
precedes that the functional architecture of the human brain is
not organized so as to function in an errorless manner and that,
as a consequence, there exists in the brain a system set to take
this fact into account; this action monitoring system checks for
possible dysfunctions, as indicated by the sensitivity of the Ne
to correctness.
It has been demonstrated that the action monitoring system
is not only competent for errors regarding the ‘‘what,’’ it is also
competent for errors regarding ‘‘when.’’ Indeed, if a deadline is
set in a choice RT task, correctly selected responses occurring
after the deadline evoke a larger Ne than correct ‘‘on time’’
responses (Johnson et al., 1997; Luu et al., 2000; De Bruijn
et al., 2005). Moreover, the later the response, the larger the
Ne. Therefore, performance regarding ‘‘when’’ the response
is issued may also be supervised by the action monitoring
system, suggesting that this system might have access to an
internal clock.
It noteworthy to indicate here that the Ne belongs to a general
class of so-called ‘‘error potentials’’ related to the detection
of abnormal functioning and action monitoring, regardless of
whether this detection relies on internal information (e.g., the
Ne) or on external information carried by a feedback. This
feedback can be explicitly delivered by the experimenter (in this
case the error potential is called feedback-related negativity: see
Miltner et al., 1997; Walsh and Anderson, 2012 for a review),
or it can be implicitly contained in the effects of the subject’s
action from which feedback information is extracted and error
potentials are evoked. These error potentials are assumed to
represent an identical family of processes and to share, at least
in part, common brain generators.
More peripheral observations also argue in favor of the
existence of an action monitoring system acting during response
execution but before error commission.
In a between-hand choice RT task involving a right or
a left thumb keypress, Allain et al. (2004a) recorded surface
EMG of the flexor pollicis brevis; they observed that the EMG
burst corresponding to errors was smaller than that of correct
responses. As a consequence, although the RT of errors was
shorter than that of correct responses, the delay separating
EMG onset from the mechanical response was longer on
errors than on correct responses, as if a tentative response
inhibition occurred on errors during their execution. One
might argue that, on errors, even the execution processes
were defective. However, the initial slope of the EMG burst
was identical on correct responses and on errors, which
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FIGURE 2 | This figure exhibits an example of a conflict task. This task is a between-hand choice RT task. In the present example, according to the color of the
response signal, subjects have to press a button as soon as possible after its presentation, using the right thumb if the signal is blue and using the left thumb if the
signal is yellow. A central fixation point is presented on the screen, upon which the subject has to fixate his/her gaze. Now, the response signal can be presented on
the same side as the required response (these associations are congruent) or on the opposite side (these associations are incongruent). Although the position of the
stimulus is irrelevant to the task, RTs and error rates are higher on incongruent associations. The RTs and/or error rate differences between congruent and
incongruent associations are called “interference effects” because, on incongruent associations, the contralateral response activated by instructions and an
automatic activation of the ipsilateral response are assumed to conflict. The resolution of this conflict takes time and sometimes fails, thus explaining the increase in
RTs and error rates on incongruent associations. There are several other examples of conflict task; in these tasks, different mutually exclusive responses are
assumed to conflict.
suggests that the motor command was initially similar for both
correct and erroneous responses (see Allain et al., 2004a, for
a more detailed discussion on this point). The EMG bursts
began to differ (on average) between correct responses and
errors about 30 ms after EMG onset. These effects have been
reproduced later (Meckler et al., 2011; Rochet et al., 2014; Roger
et al., 2014). Once again, this means that shortly after EMG
onset, but clearly before error execution, an action monitoring
system triggered a tentative inhibition, maybe to avoid the
error. It must be noted that: (1) brain activity indicating
errors and erroneous responses began to differ about 20 ms
earlier, as it takes about 20 ms for information to travel
from the primary motor cortex to hands muscles; and (2) in
order to trigger a corrective behavior, error detection must
have occurred before. Therefore, it seems that before—or at
least at the very beginning of—the execution of an error,
the action monitoring system detected that something was
going wrong.
To sum up, in sensorimotor activities under time pressure,
at the very moment when humans are producing their response,
several things happen:
(1) EMG recordings of the muscles agonists to the responses
reveal an early tentative inhibition of the response, and this
early within-trial inhibition implies that error detection has
occurred even earlier;
(2) brain structures are responsive to correctness, whether
decisional or temporal, and this sensitivity is revealed
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FIGURE 3 | The left displays Error Negativies recorded on errors (red), partial
errors (gray), and correct responses (black). Time is in abscissa in
milliseconds, and amplitude of the surface Laplacian is in ordinate, expressed
in microvolts per square centimeter (adapted from Vidal et al., 2000). The
right displays a representative (real) correct trial containing a partial error. The
black trace represents EMG recordings of the flexor pollicis brevis of the
(correctly) responding thumb; the large EMG burst corresponds to production
of the response. The red trace represents EMG recordings of the flexor
pollicis brevis for the non-required response; the very small EMG burst (in the
red circle) corresponds to the partial error. The amplitude of EMG is in
ordinate. Time is in abscissa: a zero value for time corresponds to the
presentation of the response signal, and the vertical dotted line corresponds
to the moment when the contraction of the muscle is strong enough to trigger
the mechanical response.
on EEG recordings by the early influence of response
correctness on the amplitude of the Ne.
Both early response inhibition on errors and brain
responsiveness to correctness indicate that, very early, the
action monitoring system is able to detect on-line (i.e., within
trial) that something is ‘‘going wrong.’’
WHAT DOES A HUMAN DO WHEN HE IS
ABOUT TO MAKE AN ERROR?
Although peripheral response inhibition seems to index a
desperate act of control, if it always fails, one may wonder what
its functional significance is. Other analyses, still based on EMG
recording, indicate, however, that this inhibition often succeeds.
In between-hand choice RTs tasks, Eriksen et al. (1985)
and Coles et al. (1985) observed that correct responses were
sometimes preceded by a small sub-threshold EMG activation
(insufficient to trigger an overt response) on the ‘‘wrong’’ side.
These results have often been reproduced ever since (e.g., Masaki
and Segalowitz, 2004; Allain et al., 2009; Maruo et al., 2017;
Ficarella et al., 2019). Given that these activities occur in the
‘‘wrong’’ effector, they have been considered to be partial errors
(see Figure 3 for an illustration), and ‘‘analysis of these partial
errors reveals that things may be going wrong with the system,
even when its final output, the overt behavioral response, is
correct’’ (Coles et al., 1995, p. 130). This is very important
from a human factor point of view since ‘‘things may be going
wrong’’ only covertly, and there is no behavioral evidence for
such processing failures. The positive side is, however, that these
partial errors can be overcome; that is, they can be detected,
inhibited, and corrected on time. This is suggested by the fact
that partial errors share several properties with overt errors.
For example, sequential effects are extremely similar between
errors and partial errors. Post-partial error slowing has also been
evidenced (Allain et al., 2009), although it is much smaller than
PES; however, it must be noticed that: (1) the delay separating
partial error onset from the stimulus of the next trial is longer
than that separating errors from the following stimulus and, as
it has been indicated above, the longer this delay, the smaller
PES; and (2) partial errors are separated from the next stimulus
by the correct overt response, and it is noteworthy that Fiehler
et al. (2005) failed to evidence any PES following corrected overt
errors. More recently, Ficarella et al. (2019) added new insight
regarding the nature of these sequential effects. Post (partial)-
error slowing occurs in a subset of partial errors only—the
minority (about one third: Rochet et al., 2014) of the partial errors
which are consciously detected.
Moreover, in conflict tasks, a reduction of the interference
effect has been reported after a trial containing a partial error
(Burle et al., 2002b), as is also the case after a full-blown error
(Ridderinkhof, 2002).
Error-related sequential effects are not confined to the trials
following the errors, they can also be concerned with the
preceding trials. Indeed, RTs of correct responses preceding an
error are generally faster than RTs preceding another correct
response (Smith and Brewer, 1995; Allain et al., 2009). The same
effect has been observed before partial errors: RTs preceding
partial errors were faster than RTs preceding a correct response
(Allain et al., 2009). If we admit that PES may, in part,
reflect more cautious behavior triggered by action monitoring,
these effects suggest that before-errors and also partial-errors
subjects have adopted an error-prone, less cautious behavior with
lowered control.
Finally, partial errors usually elicit a Ne that is time locked
to their onset. This Ne has an earlier latency (Masaki and
Segalowitz, 2004; Maruo et al., 2017), and its amplitude is, in
general, larger than that of correct responses but smaller than that
of overt errors (e.g., Scheffers et al., 1996; Vidal et al., 2000; Roger
et al., 2010; Maruo et al., 2017). In some instances, however,
the amplitude of the Ne of partial errors may be as large as
that of full-blown errors (Carbonnell and Falkenstein, 2006).
Note that in this latter case, however, partial errors were defined
not on the basis of subthreshold EMG activity but on the basis
of subthreshold force production, which likely accounts for the
results of Carbonnell and Falkenstein (2006).
The preceding observations suggest that partial errors were
‘‘small errors’’ that could be corrected on time or, even better,
erroneous response activations that remained small because they
were quickly detected, inhibited, and corrected on time.
Moreover, the larger the size of the partial error, the longer
it takes to correct it (i.e., to emit the correct response once this
partial error has been suppressed) and the larger the Ne (Burle
et al., 2008); intracerebral recordings (LFPs) in humans allowed
for the examining of the (co)relations between partial errors
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EMGbursts and the Ne on a trial-by-trial basis. Partial errors LFP
activity peaked when partial errors were inhibited and stopped
when the correction began (Bonini et al., 2014), suggesting that:
(1) large partial errors, being closer to a full error, evoked larger
Nes and required more processing before being corrected; and
(2) that the Ne might represent an alarm signal at work until the
correction is completed.
Sometimes, the action monitoring process allowing these
fast inhibitions fails and a full-blown error occurs. However,
a sign of this tentative inhibition still persists on errors: the
EMG burst is smaller on errors than on correct responses (see
preceding section).
If this interpretation is correct, partial errors reveal, once
again, that information processing is not organized to function in
an error-free manner; however, correction is possible and nearly
always attempted. It is to be noted that the deafferented patient
studied by Allain et al. (2004b) also presented partial errors that
evoked a Ne whose amplitude was intermediate between that
of the Ne evoked by correct responses and errors. Of course,
these partial errors could hardly be detected (and corrected) on
the basis of somatosensory information, and visual or auditory
information were absent due to a partial error, failing to result in
movement or a a much-needed button click.
Partial errors, when compared to errors, allow for the
calculation of a correction ratio: the number of partial errors
divided by the total number of incorrect activations (partial
errors plus errors). This correction ratio (expressed between zero
and one) can be considered as a measure of the efficiency of the
supervisory system (Burle et al., 2002b).
If this opinion is correct, there may exist two (independent)
factors contributing to variations of accuracy: those resulting
from variations in the reliability of the information processing
chain and those resulting from variations in the efficiency of
the action monitoring system. Two datasets can exemplify the
contribution of each of these factors.
van de Laar et al. (2012) showed that, in a choice RT task,
8 or 12-year-old children committed about three times more
errors (9.7%) than 20-year-old adults (3.5%). The same effect
showed up on partial errors (29.05% vs. 10.1%; calculated based
on table 2 in van de Laar et al., 2012, p. 327). On this basis it
is possible to estimate the correction ratio of the children (0.76)
and young adults (0.74). It is clear that the increase in the error
rate of children cannot be attributed to a failure of the action
monitoring system as they could correct their errors at least as
well as young adults. On the contrary, the differences in error
rates are completely explained by a larger proportion of incorrect
activations (partial errors plus errors).
The reverse is observed in Parkinsonian patients receiving
Dopa therapy. Fluchère et al. (2015) analyzed errors, partial
errors, and correction rates in Parkinsonian patients in two
different conditions: off medication and on medication. They
showed that error rates were increased by dopa therapy, and
that this increase was completely explained by a decrease of
correction rates—a decrease in the efficiency of the action
monitoring system.
Finally, in healthy adults, it has been demonstrated that a large
part of the increase in error rates when subjects trade accuracy
for speed in sensorimotor tasks is due to a lower efficiency of the
action monitoring system: from 93% under accurate conditions,
the correction rate may drop to 71% under speeded conditions
(Burle et al., 2014).
The data presented up to now indicate that the action
monitoring system is competent to supervise errors of selection
and temporal errors. Recent data indicate that it is also competent
regarding execution errors.
Meckler et al. (2017) examined partial correct responses,
i.e., subthreshold EMG activities that were insufficient in
triggering the correct response but were followed by an overt
correct response (Questienne et al., 2018). First, the EMG
burst corresponding to the ‘‘corrective’’ response of the partial
correct activation was larger and more phasic than that of the
‘‘corrective’’ response of partial errors or that of ‘‘pure’’ correct
responses (‘‘corrective’’ responses of partial errors and ‘‘pure’’
correct responses did not differ from one another). This suggests
that the execution of the response force was insufficient, and
that it was ‘‘overcorrected’’ when executing the ‘‘corrective’’
response. Second, the force exerted on correct trials preceding
partial correct trials, although sufficient to trigger the mechanical
response, was smaller than that of pure correct trials preceding
other pure correct trials. This was not the case for trials preceding
partial error trials. This suggests that before a partial correct trial,
subjects were in a phase where the representation of the to-be-
produced force was not very accurate3. Finally, the Ne evoked
by partial correct responses was larger than that of pure correct
responses and marginally smaller than that evoked by partial
errors. Given that the required force never varied throughout
the experiment, subjects could program this parameter and
did not have to select it at each trial. These partial errors
can therefore hardly be attributed to a failure of the selection
process. On the contrary, they appear to result from failures
of the execution process4. As a consequence, one can conclude
that the competence of the supervisory system also extends to
execution errors.
To sum up, partial response activations first indicate that
the action monitoring system is able to ‘‘on-line’’ detect,
inhibit, and correct most incorrect activations. In other words,
the supervisory system can trigger remedial activities not
only between but also within trials. Only when these action
monitoring processes fail does an overt error occur. Examining
the correction ratio can determine which factors hamper the
proper functioning of the action monitoring system. Second,
the properties of partial correct responses indicate that the
supervisory system not only monitors response selection and
temporal accuracy, but also monitors execution accuracy. Third,
although tasks like those presented here define errors in an all
or none manner, it is unlikely that the same holds true for the
3By training, subjects can establish an internal ‘‘model’’ of some parameters of
the to-be-produced response, such as the required force, and this can be used to
controlled the response force; this internal model is often called a representation.
To be accurate, this model has to be updated. If it is not, the exerted force can be
inappropriate.
4It is worth noting that not all partial correct responses unequivocally represent
execution errors: this clearly depends on the experimental setup (see Questienne
et al., 2018 for a convincing illustration).
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supervisory system, which seems to evaluate performance on a
more continuous scale. This is suggested by the fact that there is
an increases in the amplitude of the Ne from correct responses
to partial errors and from partial errors to full blown errors; the
larger the size of the partial error (i.e., the closer it is to a full
blown error), the larger the Ne. It could therefore very well be
that the way certain tasks are prescribed is not in accordance
with the representation of correctness set by the human action
monitoring system.
Finally, from a human factors point of view, these
observations show that the error rate alone is a rather poor
reflection of the effects of experimental conditions or working
conditions on information processing and/or action monitoring
processes. If one seeks to counteract the effect of work deleterious
situations on sensorimotor performances one has to first identify
on which system (information processing chain or action
monitoring system or both) these deleterious situations have an
effect before envisioning any countermeasure.
WHAT DOES A HUMAN DO WHEN HE
MIGHT MAKE AN ERROR?
Certain RT situations are risky, others are not. For example, in a
simple RT task, the risk of committing an error of decision is null
(if there are no ‘‘catch’’ trials—rare trials in which the response
signals requires refrain responding), and the only possibilities of
inappropriate behavior are errors of execution (e.g., insufficient
response force), anticipations, or late responses in the case of
a deadline.
On the contrary, in choice RT tasks, depending on the
paradigm and speed-accuracy strategy, the risk of committing
errors is much higher and, if the stimuli are unambiguous,
most errors are decisional (with a small percentage of
execution errors).
We will see in the following section that the actionmonitoring
system is able to take into account this risk and sets specific
mechanisms to prevent them.
In a between-hand choice RT task, it has been demonstrated
that spinal excitability (as assessed by the Hoffmann reflex)
is stable during most of the RT period; however, in its very
last part, sudden changes occur just before EMG onset. The
excitability of spinal motoneurons controlling the responding
hand muscles increases, while that of spinal motoneurons
controlling non-responding hand muscles (or, in other words,
those involved in the not to be produced response) decreases
(Hasbroucq et al., 2000).
In the same kind of paradigm, Burle et al. (2002a) studied
the time course of intracortical excitability of the primary
motor cortices (M1) thanks to the duration of the silent period
(SP) evoked by transcranial magnetic stimulation. The SP
corresponds to a transient drop in EMG activity, which extends
for a short time period, just after the motor potential evoked
by the magnetic stimulation. Contrary to the motor evoked
potential, the origin of the SP is purely intracortical (e.g., Roick
et al., 1993; Schnitzler and Benecke, 1994), and, as such, it has
been used as a probe of intracortical excitability: the shorter
the duration of the SP, the higher M1 excitability, while the
longer the duration of the SP, the lower M1 excitability. In
a between-hand choice RT task, Burle et al. (2002a) showed
that after a certain delay from the time of presentation of the
stimulus, the duration of the SP progressively decreased when the
stimulated site is contralateral to the responding hand (involved
in the response), while, concurrently, the duration of the SP
progressively increased when the stimulated site is ipsilateral to
the responding hand (involved in the non-required response).
This means that before EMG onset, M1 involved in the response
was activated, while M1 involved in the not to be produced
response was inhibited.
In the same type of task, Tandonnet et al. (2011) demonstrated
that the Motor Evoked Potentials (MEP) generated in the
muscles involved in the response by the magnetic transcranial
stimulation of contralateral M1 increased just before EMG
onset, while the MEP of ipsilateral M1 decreased just before
EMG onset. This dataset perfectly bridges the gap between
the observations of Hasbroucq et al. (2000) and those of
Burle et al. (2002a).
Still, in a between-hand choice RT task, response-locked ERPs
showed that, shortly before EMG onset, a transient negativity
developed over contralateral M1, while a positive wave developed
over ipsilateral M1 (Vidal et al., 2003; van de Laar et al.,
2012; Amengual et al., 2014)5. This EEG negativity/positivity
pattern is to be considered the EEG counterpart of the
activation/inhibition pattern evidenced by Burle et al. (2002a;
see Burle et al., 2004, for a detailed discussion of this point).
Considering that EEG recordings (even Laplacian-transformed)
are much easier to perform than H-reflex or TMS measures, this
activation/inhibition pattern has been explored thanks to EEG
recordings as detailed below.
Given that the topic of this article concerns errors, one
can guess that the working hypothesis regarding this pattern is
that, although activation relates to the build-up of the motor
command, inhibition is set to prevent errors on the ‘‘wrong’’ side.
If this is the case, when only one hand is involved and,
as a consequence, there is no risk of committing an error,
no ipsilateral inhibition should be evidenced. This situation
is seen in Go/NoGo tasks where, although a certain type of
decision is to be taken (doing or not doing), this decision is
not about executing one of two (or more) movements (see
Figure 1 for an illustration). In such a situation, contralateral
activation is, of course, present because the movement must
be triggered, but inhibition is absent (Vidal et al., 2011). This
is a necessary but insufficient observation in favor of the idea
that ipsilateral inhibition would reveal errors prevention. To
support this hypothesis more firmly, it is mandatory to explicitly
manipulate the risk of errors.
This can easily be achieved by manipulating the probability
of each response in a between-hand choice RT paradigm,
either in a classical 0.5/0.5 probability distribution for each
response or in a biased 0.8/0.2 probability distribution for each
response. The lower the probability of a response, the more
5Note that this EEG pattern cannot be evidenced unless appropriate spatial
filtering methods, such as the Laplacian transformation, are computed based on
scalp potentials.
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unexpected it is and the higher the error likelihood for this
response. While contralateral activation is unaffected by the
probability bias, ipsilateral inhibition is affected. The higher the
error rate [under the influence of (un)expectancy], the stronger
the ipsilateral inhibition (Meckler et al., 2010). Moreover, in
the unexpected condition (0.2 probability for the required
response), where the error rate was the highest, there was an
inverse correlation between error rate and strength of ipsilateral
inhibition. The subjects who showed the strongest ipsilateral
inhibition were those who produced the lowest error rate
(Meckler et al., 2010).
In light of these results, it is noteworthy that 8-year-old and
12-year-old children of van de Laar et al. (2012), who commit
about three times more errors and partial errors than young
adults, completely lacked ipsilateral inhibition6.
In the experiment of Meckler et al. (2010), biased or unbiased
conditions were administered in separate blocks. It is therefore
possible that the action monitoring system had set the relative
strength of possible inhibitions of each side before each block.
Could it be possible that the relative strength of each inhibition
would be set at each trial after the response signal?
To answer this question, Burle et al. (2016) manipulated
the probability of compatible and incompatible trials in a
conflict task while keeping the probability of all other events
(stimuli attributes and responses sides) equal. Subjects had
to respond according to the color of a stimulus that could
either spatially correspond to the response (compatible trials)
or spatially correspond to the not to be produced response
(incompatible trials). In blocks of frequent incompatible trials,
the error rate was quite low, and the strength of inhibition was
not different for compatible and incompatible trials. On the
contrary, in blocks of frequent compatible trials, the error rate
for incompatible trials was quite high and ipsilateral inhibition
was stronger on (rare) incompatible than on (frequent)
compatible trials.
It should be stressed that, in the compatible frequent blocks,
neither the compatibility nor the nature of the required response
could be predicted. This demonstrates that the strength of
ipsilateral inhibition was to be adapted on each trial, after
the presentation of the response signal. These results highlight
the high versatility of the action monitoring system which, in
parallel with sensorimotor information processing and under
time pressure, has to very quickly evaluate the nature of
the risk (i.e., the stimulus response association: compatible
or incompatible), the nature of the response (i.e., right
or left) to be inhibited, and the strength to be set for
this inhibition.
To sum up, in sensorimotor activities realized under time
pressure involving a choice between several overt actions, the
action monitoring system sets preventive inhibition of the
possible erroneous responses, the strength of this inhibition
predicts (between subjects) the error rate, the strength of this
inhibition is highly dependent on the context, and, considering
6Remember that the reason why children commit more errors than young adults
is not related to a lower correction rate but a much higher rate of initial incorrect
activations.
that the strength of this context-dependent inhibition can be set
within trial, it can be concluded that the supervisory system is
extremely flexible.
RELEVANCE TO HUMAN FACTORS AND
THE BRAIN AT WORK IN EVERYDAY
SETTINGS
The System Approach Still Needs Scientific
(and Extra-Scientific) Support in the Real
World; Basic Knowledge on Action
Monitoring May Contribute to This Support
The fact that different specific action monitoring mechanisms
take errors into account at different stages of sensorimotor
information processing suggests that, for this type of processing,
errors are part of the normal functioning of the human
brain and are not just occasional unavoidable and undesirable
dysfunctions. Put differently, errors are not simply unavoidable
failures; on the contrary, errors are integrated into the normal
structure of the human information-processing architecture. As
a consequence, it seems reasonable to admit that the systems
to which human operators belong should be designed to live
with human errors and to avoid (or minimize the likelihood)
that the consequences of these errors generate system failures.
In other words, knowledge on action monitoring issued from
basic research strongly advocates in favor of the idea that
the ‘‘system approach’’ is much preferable to the ‘‘person
approach’’ to improve safety. One could feel that such basic
research arguments are useless (or come too late) since most
scientists do consider that humans cannot completely avoid
committing errors. Nevertheless, several researchers in the
safety domain also indicate that, in the analysis of failures
and accidents, the person approach is still pervasive—probably
because, in this domain, there is a ‘‘. . . gap between research
and practice’’ (Underwood and Waterson, 2013, p. 155), as
stated by Catino (2008), ‘‘Though favoured by the scientists,
the organizational function logic approach is in real life
usually beaten by the individual blame logic’’ (p. 53). In the
same vein, Bitar et al. (2018), in a case study, reported that
‘‘. . . the proposed solution was to re-train the individuals
to reduce the likelihood of error in the future . . .’’. More
generally, Leveson (2011a) considers that, among the misleading
assumptions widely shared in the safety domain, one can find
the following: ‘‘(1) Most accidents are caused by operator error;
and (2) rewarding ‘‘correct’’ behavior and punishing ‘‘incorrect’’
behavior will eliminate or reduce accidents significantly’’ (p. 61).
The same author also considers that ‘‘These assumptions
underlie the common behavioral approach to occupational
safety’’ (p. 61), and that, in case of systems failures, ‘‘. . .if
there are operators in the system, they are most likely to be
blamed.’’ (Leveson, 2011b; but see also Ivensky, 2017a,b for
similar views). These attitudes still correspond to the ‘‘person
approach’’ criticized by Reason (2000). All these remarks from
safety specialists indicate that the ‘system approach’ still needs
(scientific and extra scientific) support, as opposed to the
‘‘person approach.’’ The data set reviewed here on action
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monitoring is one element (among others) that lends support
to the ‘‘system approach’’ and might contribute to reinforcing
its position.
A Word of Caution Regarding the
Ecological Validity of the Results From
Basic Research Laboratory Tasks
Before examining the relevance to human factors and possible
applications of the data set reviewed here further, a word of
caution is needed regarding the ecological validity of the results
obtained in the type of laboratory tasks presented here so far.
Most of them are RT tasks that were realized with simple and
often arbitrary stimulus-to-response mapping instructions (but
think of a car driver when the traffic light turns red); they were
realized in controlled laboratory conditions in which, unless
attention is studied, no other task or information interfered
with the processes under study. In other words, these processes
are studied in their optimal working conditions, and one must
admit that these optimal conditions are scarcely met in the real
world. From these tasks, therefore, it is clearly not possible to
directly infer what should be done in real world conditions to
improve working environments for safety. Nonetheless, these
tasks, because simple and controlled, allow for the proposing of
some ideas about what should not be done in these real-world
situations; if limitations of a given process can be found under
optimal conditions, these limitations are likely still present in
sub-optimal ones (might even be worse) and can reasonably be
taken into account for applications when the brain works in
everyday settings.
For example, in conflict tasks, under optimal laboratory
conditions, incongruent stimulus-to-response associations
hamper correction of covert errors (Burle et al., 2014), which
increases the error rate; there is little doubt that incongruent
associations will also hamper action monitoring in the more
complex, uncertain, or noisy environments encountered outside
the laboratory. We elaborate upon this point further in the
following section.
Basic Research Knowledge on Action
Monitoring Processes May Be Useful for
Applications in the Context of Working by
Identifying Some of Their Limitations
The ‘‘system approach’’ considers that work environments
may not be in accordance with the principles of organization
of the operator information processing system, which, as a
consequence, may increase the likelihood of errors and their
undesirable outcomes (Reason, 2000, 2005; Ivensky, 2017a,b;
Leveson, 2012; Bitar et al., 2018). Put differently ‘‘We design
systems in which human error is inevitable and then blame
the human and not the system design’’ (Leveson, 2012,
p. 47). Changing the environment most often revealed to
be much more efficient than trying to reduce human errors
by manipulating rewards and punishments (Leveson, 2012,
but see also Fitts, 1947 for a similar view). Therefore, even
for those who are interested in application purposes (e.g.,
adapting machines/environment to human capabilities), there
is a need for basic research knowledge regarding human
information processing architecture and its limiting factors.
This basic knowledge should help avoiding a priori situations
‘‘in which human error is inevitable.’’ For example, in the
specific case of sharing functions between pilots and machines,
Fitts, who largely concerned himself with sensorimotor activities
under time pressure, already considered more than 70 years
ago that ‘‘Knowledge of human abilities and limitations is
also needed in deciding what equipment should be operated
by the pilot and what equipment should be made entirely
automatic. . .’’ (p. 30).
Obviously, the generation of errors is a well-known
human limitation. Conversely, error detection, inhibition, and
correction are an important ability of the human brain that can
be exploited, and it must therefore be preserved. Knowledge
regarding its limitations or its limiting factors may contribute
to proposing ideas regarding what should be avoided if one
seeks to preserve action monitoring abilities at their best level
in real-world environments where sensorimotor information
has to be processes under time pressure (e.g., a driver in his
car, a pilot in his plane, a sprinter in his starting blocks,
or a goal keeper before a penalty kick). To illustrate this
point, four examples of well-established adverse conditions
for action monitoring are presented in the following section.
In these examples, it is reasonable to assume that real-world
environments would not abolish the deleterious effect of
these experimental conditions, which results can reasonably be
extrapolated to real-world conditions.
Incongruent Stimulus-to-Response Associations and
Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff
In conflict tasks, incongruent conditions generate slower RTs and
increased error rates. As already indicated, a significant part of
the interference effects observed on error rates is accounted for
by a reduced efficiency of the supervisory system, as revealed
by reduced correction ratio on incongruent conditions as
compared to congruent ones. Moreover, this reduction of action
monitoring efficiency on incongruent conditions is strongly
amplified under speed instructions as compared to accuracy
instructions (Burle et al., 2014).
Low Doses of Alcohol
In a conflict task, low doses of alcohol did not affect the accuracy
of the subjects; interference effects were not affected either
(neither on RTs nor on accuracy), and overall RTs were only
slightly slower (352 ms vs. 360 ms for placebo and lowest doses,
respectively, and higher doses generated larger effects). On the
contrary, the effects observed on action monitoring processes
were significant. The reduction of interference effects usually
present after an error completely disappeared (Ridderinkhof
et al., 2002); moreover these low doses of alcohol selectively
reduced the amplitude of the Ne, although the error rate
was not affected. The sensitivity of the Ne to low doses
of alcohol contrasted with the insensitivity of short- and
long-latency stimulus-evoked potentials at these same doses
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2002). The effects of alcohol on the
Ne were therefore specific and could not be attributed to a
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general depression of the electrogenesis. The strong sensitivity
of these supervisory mechanisms showed that action monitoring
is among the first functions upon which alcohol exerts
its deleterious effects.
Sleep Deprivation
In a conflict task, one night of sleep deprivation weakly increased
RTs, but it could be shown that this increase was completely
explained by peripheral motor effects (i.e., increase of the
delay separating EMG onset from the mechanical response),
leaving central processes (i.e., the delay separating the occurrence
of the response signal from EMG onset) unaffected. Only
on incongruent associations was the error rate increased by
sleep deprivation. On congruent associations, no effect on the
error rate could be seen. Therefore, for congruent associations,
no real effect on information processing (except on its most
peripheral motor component) could be found after one night
of sleep deprivation (Ramdani et al., 2013). On the contrary,
the sensitivity of the supervisory system, as revealed by the
amplitude of the Ne on errors and partial errors, was reduced
both on congruent and incongruent associations; this effect was
selective, given that other event-related components were left
unaffected by this sleep deprivation. Therefore, on congruent
associations, an ‘‘infraclinical’’ sensitivity of the supervisory
system to sleep deprivation was unmasked by studying the
Ne. It is not unlikely that under longer sleep deprivation
or less optimal conditions than those encountered in the
laboratory, this ‘‘infraclinical’’ sensitivity would have turned into
a behavioral sensitivity.
Mental Fatigue
Mental fatigue (as revealed by the effects of time on task)
is known to impair performance (RTs and error rates).
It has been shown that this impairment also involves the
supervisory system (Boksem et al., 2006); in the task used,
subjects had the possibility to correct their overt errors in a
500 ms delay following their response. First, a drop in the
correction rate of overt errors occurred with fatigue (39% only
as compared to 73% in non-fatigue conditions). Second, PES
was no longer present under fatigue conditions. Moreover,
mental fatigue strongly reduced the amplitude of the Ne on
errors to about one fourth of that evoked in non-fatigue
conditions (see Figure 3 of Boksem et al., 2006). These
results indicated that the capacities of detection and correction
of the action monitoring system are dramatically reduced
by mental fatigue.
Motivation
One might argue that, when humans work, motivation could
counteract the effects of fatigue on the supervisory system.
However, Boksem et al. (2006) also studied the consequences
of monetary motivation on fatigue effects. Although motivation
perfectly restored RTs (but left error rates unaffected), PES of
fatigued but motivated subjects was modestly restored to about
one third only of PES under non-fatigue conditions (see Figure 2
of Boksem et al., 2006). Regarding the Ne evoked by errors,
its amplitudes was only weakly restored by motivation (see
Figure 3 of Boksem et al., 2006). Therefore, motivation has an
effect on the action monitoring system, but this effect, although
present, is not very efficient and hardly counteracts the effects of
mental fatigue.
To sum up, the effects of low doses of alcohol, mental
fatigue, motivation, sleep deprivation, congruency, or speed-
accuracy trade-off have been investigated in artificial but optimal
laboratory conditions; they were aimed at evidencing limiting
factors of the actionmonitoring system or unfavorable situations.
One can reason that these limiting factors would also have
similar (or even stronger) effects in sub-optimal situations,
such as those encountered when the brain works in everyday
settings. If this opinion is correct, then certain results from
laboratory experiments can quite easily be extrapolated to real
world situations.
Several Laboratory Observations on Action
Monitoring Still Hold True in More
Ecological Tasks or Environments
As already indicated, the reported paradigms used to study
information processing under time pressure are quite far
from ecological tasks or environments, but can, under certain
conditions, bring valuable information for application purposes.
Moreover, recent efforts have been made to examine whether
the results obtained so far with these paradigms could be
generalized to other conditions or tasks, as certain tasks are much
closer to everyday situations. We give some examples in the
following section.
PES can be observed not only in simple ‘‘key press’’ tasks
but also in more natural movements, such as in tasks requiring
the reaching for and grasping of objects. This PES occurs not
only after an error (Ceccarini and Castiello, 2018) but also after
observing other individuals committing an error (Ceccarini and
Castiello, 2019); in these cases, the grasping component of the
natural movement shows a PES.
From an explicit neuroergonomic perspective, the possible
influence of congruency on the Ne has also been studied for
very complex visual stimuli arrays, such as a motorcycle to be
detected in a complex natural image (Sawyer et al., 2017). The
usual sensitivity of the Ne to correctness still holds in these
complex situations. In a very natural behavior such as speech,
a clear Ne is also evoked in naming tasks; the Ne is small but
present on correct naming and much larger on naming errors
(Riès et al., 2011, 2013). In pointing tasks via a cursor on a
screen (very similar to some everyday tasks), a Ne can also
be evoked on pointing errors; moreover, small initial pointing
errors that are quickly corrected share several properties with
the partial errors observed in choice RT tasks and, as expected
from partial errors, they also evoke a Ne (Kieffaber et al., 2016).
Even more recently—and within an environment even closer
to natural situations—in a competitive-type consumer baseball
video game, batting errors evoked a Ne for the batter during the
200 ms before swinging strikes, whereas this was was not the
case for the pitcher. An interesting point here was that the error
potentials were evoked at a moment when the ball was ‘‘flying’’
to the batter, that is, before the error event onset (Yokota et al.,
2019). Finally, error potentials have been successfully studied not
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only in a simulated but also in a real-world driving task (Zhang
et al., 2015).
Although very natural, all these tasks involved discrete
responses, but error potentials can also be observed on errors
in continuous tasks. In continuous tracking movements with a
mouse controlling a cursor on a computer screen, it has been
demonstrated that hand position has to be repeatedly monitored
and corrected; in these continuous actions, small sub movements
periodically correct the trajectory of the cursor (Pereira et al.,
2017). Error potentials are evoked by these sub movements and
source localization methods suggest that these error potentials
are generated in the same structures as the Ne evoked by
erroneous responses, such as discrete button presses (Pereira
et al., 2017). Therefore, several recent data sets indicate that
the action monitoring mechanisms revealed by the influence
of correctness on the amplitude of error potentials in artificial
laboratory tasks also hold true ‘‘. . .in conditions approximating
those in normal daily life.’’ (Yokota et al., 2019, p. 11) and even
hold true in a real-world driving task (Zhang et al., 2015).
These results obtained in rather ecological situations suggest
that several properties of the supervisory system hold true outside
of the artificial conditions of laboratory tasks. Therefore, a certain
number of its abilities might be exploited in real-world situations.
For example, the ability to quickly correct inappropriate behavior
could be exploited to improve system safety by designing these
systems in such a way that correction is always possible when
humans have to process information under time pressure. This
would not reduce the number of human errors but might
contribute to the avoidance of some of their bad outcomes;
in these cases, certain man–machine systems would become
more resilient to human errors. With the development of
technology in the near future, Brain Computer Interfaces could
monitor error potentials in real-world situations and allow for
the detection of ‘‘infraclinical’’ decreases of sensitivity to errors
of the supervisory system of an operator before this decreased
sensitivity becomes ‘‘clinical.’’ However, given what has been
acknowledged in the section regarding the ecological validity of
laboratory tasks, despite the fact that several properties of the
action monitoring system hold in quite ecological conditions,
real-world experiments should be conducted beforehand to
verify that fast corrections or sensitivity to errors of the error
potentials are still present in the complex, noisy, or uncertain
environments that can be encountered when the brain works
in everyday settings.
Laboratory Physiological Measures
Related to Action Monitoring May Be Used
to Study the Brain at Work in Everyday
Settings
Physiological indices of action monitoring processes may not
only help us understand action monitoring mechanisms and
their limitations, but they can also be useful for Brain Computer
Interfaces (BCIs), even for those interested in the brain at work
in everyday settings.
BCIs can be separated into active, reactive, and passive ones.
In active BCIs, the user consciously tries to control his/her brain
signals to produce appropriate input for the machine so that
the machine can generate an appropriate action (e.g., turning
a wheelchair to the right by imagining a movement of the
right hand). Reactive BCIs take advantage of the specific brain
responses to stimuli to which attention is paid; these specific
responses tell the machine which stimulus the subject is paying
attention to (e.g., a letter to be selected for spelling purpose). ‘‘An
elegant approach to improve the accuracy of BCIs consists in a
verification procedure directly based on the presence of error-
related potentials. . .’’ (Ferrez and del R Millán, 2008, p. 923).
In these cases, single-trial detection of error potentials tells the
machine that the brain has (covertly) detected an error; this
allows themachine to adapt its responses to its inputs. This aspect
of the BCIs is by nature ‘‘passive’’ as the error potentials are not
generated by the brain purposely.
In the domain of rehabilitation, several types of BCIs
are developed in order to allow disabled persons to
control specific devices through their brain activity only
(e.g., for communication, controlling wheelchairs, controlling
neuroprosthetics, etc.); usually, these BCIs are active or reactive,
but adding a passive component based on the analysis of error
potentials improves their efficiency (e.g., Kreilinger et al., 2012;
Perrin et al., 2012; Iturrate et al., 2015).
More generally, ‘‘Passive BCIs are typically the kind of BCIs
that can be used for neuroergonomics research and applications.’’
(Lotte and Roy, 2019, p. 3). In these BCIs, the human is not
required to control explicitly any device through the brain
activity of interest; this activity can nevertheless be used to
improve the quality of the (active or reactive) man–machine
interaction by adapting the response of themachine to themental
state of the subjects (fatigue, inattention, error detection, etc.);
this occurs effortlessly for the operator who may not even be
aware of it (Zander et al., 2016). Taking error potential into
account in passive BCIs has proven to be extremely efficient
(Ferrez and del R Millán, 2008; Chavarriaga and Millán, 2010;
Chavarriaga et al., 2014; Dyson et al., 2015; Zander et al., 2016
for a review) and ‘‘. . . brings human cognition directly into
the human-computer interaction loop, expanding the traditional
notions of ‘‘interaction’’ (Zander et al., 2016, p. 14, 898).
With passive BCIs using error potentials, a task can even be
completed by a man–machine system without the man explicitly
trying to realize this task: if a subject looks at the displacement
by the discrete steps of a cursor on a grid, if this subjects is
informed of a final target that the cursor is supposed to reach,
and if this subjects has to give a judgement on the quality of
each discrete step (which is not used as input to the machine),
any deviation from the optimal trajectory at each step will evoke
error potentials, where the amplitude depends on the size of the
deviation. By recording these error potentials and using them as
input to the machine, this machine will learn to correctly guide
the cursor to the target while participants are unaware of having
communicated any information to the machine (Zander et al.,
2016).
It is noteworthy that, on the human side of the system,
the passive nature of these BCIs is an important characteristic
because the additional man–machine interaction carried out by
the elicitation of error potentials does not require additional
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processing resources; as such, this interaction, although efficient
for the task, is workload free.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, in sensorimotor activities developed under time
pressure, the action monitoring system acts before, during, and
after the action in order to take errors into account, in which
‘‘before’’ refers to error likelihood and need for covert inhibition
of undesirable responses, ‘‘during’’ refers to response quality
and, when necessary, the need for correction, and ‘‘after’’ refers
to, if necessary, the need for strategic adjustments. In other
words, error is taken into account by the action monitoring
system at every step of response production. This indicates that
the cognitive architecture, at least in sensorimotor activities,
is intrinsically organized to live with a certain dose of error,
whether overt or covert.
In the frame of a system approach, these facts should
be taken into account for: (1) designing in the workspace,
whenever possible, systems and organizations allowing the
human operator to correct their own errors before they
finally result in a system failure in sensorimotor activities
(outside the sensorimotor domain think, for example, of
the Flaujac accident); (2) identifying first which cognitive
system (information processing chain, action monitoring
system, or both) is affected by deleterious work situations
before envisioning countermeasures against these detrimental
situations; (3) identifying limiting factors of the action
monitoring system to help preventing deleterious situations,
whether environmental or due to ‘‘. . . systems in which human
error is inevitable. . .’’ (Leveson, 2012, p. 47); (4) verifying in the
near future to which extent certain abilities of the supervisory
system identified in the artificial world of the laboratory would
still hold true in real-world environments; and (5) developing,
in the near future, thanks to future technical evolutions, passive
BCIs, able to detect ‘‘infraclinical’’ drops in the efficiency of the
operator’s supervisory system, either to help them in their task or
to withdraw them from a potentially hazardous situation.
Taking these points into consideration may help to prevent a
certain proportion or errors; it may also help to adapt systems to
tolerate a certain dose of human errors in order to become more
resilient to them. This would be appropriate considering, as have
several other authors (e.g., Reason, 1990, 2000; Amalberti, 2001,
2013), that errors are consubstantial to the human information
processing system and that ‘‘Far from being rooted in irrational
or maladaptive tendencies, (these recurrent) error forms have
their origins in fundamentally useful psychological processes’’
(Reason, 1990, p. 1).
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